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Abstract
Dominant trends within the philosophical debate over personhood and identity 
tend to discount the significance and meaning of the human body and often slip into 
dualistic conceptions. I will argue that a Catholic theology of the body challenges 
many of the prevalent understandings in bioethics today. Such a notion takes Christ’s 
Incarnation as its foundation and seeks to develop an account of the human body in 
the context of the call to communion imprinted on humanity as made in the image of 
the Trinitarian communion of love. Such a conception counteracts forms of utilitarian 
or technological reductionism of the person. While Catholic bioethicists will need 
to consider how such an account will have practical applicability to cases, the call 
to communion ought to be fostered through the liturgical life of the Church, which 
enables Catholic bioethicists to develop a liturgical worldview that guards against 
devaluations of the dignity of the human person.
Keywords
Person, body, communion of persons, John Paul II, liturgy, sacraments, Christian 
anthropology, dualism, utilitarianism, Incarnation, sacramentality, theology of the 
body, ritual.
“The truth is that only in the mystery of the incarnate Word does the 
mystery of man take on light... Christ... fully reveals man to himself and 
makes his supreme calling clear”1. While this Christological-anthropological 
affirmation of the Second Vatican Council is one of the most frequently cited 
conciliar passages within the recent magisterial documents of the Church, 
it is difficult to perceive how it might immediately be applied to the field 
of bioethics. However, a fundamental issue underlying many contemporary 
1 Gaudium et Spes 22; A. Flannery O.P., (ed.), New York, 1998, Costello Publishing Company. 
All citations given will be from this translation.
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medical and bioethical debates is the nature and status of the human person”2. 
The bioethicists, philosophers, legal scholars, and theologians involved in 
the personhood debate identify personhood in several key ways, definitions 
which are themselves based on anthropological presuppositions, assumptions 
about the role, scope and limits of technology, or the function of deliberative 
processes in pluralistic societies. Missing from many contemporary notions 
of personhood is an adequate account and understanding of the role, purpose, 
and meaning of the body.
In this paper, I will begin by indicating several dominant non-Catholic 
voices within the historical personhood debate in the United States. Since the 
views of these authors are of central importance, it will be necessary to briefly 
summarize their views, in order to inquire about how a Catholic conception 
of the human person might contribute to what is found lacking. It will be 
evident that dualistic underpinnings of these conceptions of personhood are the 
result of the larger framework of “technological utopianism” that underlies the 
“Baconian project”3. I will argue that a Catholic theology of the body challenges 
many of these prevailing notions by pointing to the significance and meaning 
of the human body as revelatory of the person. Such a notion takes Christ’s 
Incarnation as its foundation, and seeks to uphold a communion of human 
persons created in and called to imitate the Trinitarian love of God. Finally, 
this communion marked by solidarity and openness in all human relationships 
ought to be fostered through the liturgical life of the Church, which enables 
Catholics to develop a liturgical worldview that guards against devaluations of 
the dignity of the human person, and which provides for Catholic bioethicists 
a locus of formation from which to articulate their own positions.
1. Personhood and Human Dignity or Sacredness
In his article, “Four Indicators of Humanhood – the Inquiry Matures”, 
the American bioethicist Joseph F. Fletcher provides an analysis of several 
2 Thus, the fundamental definition of personhood will affect concrete discussions of abortion, 
embryonic research and experimentation, gene therapy and genetic manipulation, cloning, care for 
the elderly, the physician-patient relationship, etc.
3 For a thorough discussion of the “Baconian project” see G. McKenny, To Relieve the Human 
Condition: Bioethics, Medicine, and the Body, Albany 1997, SUNY Press.
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prevailing notions of personhood”4. On the one hand, three notions of 
personhood which are analyzed identify the notion of personhood by placing 
primary importance on a particular time, phenomenon, or experience. 
Opposed to any of these views stands the “biological species” view, offered 
by William E. May, in which personhood is determined by “virtue of who we 
are [as members of the human species], and not by what we achieve or do”5. 
While articulating differing opinions, all of these scholars are united in their 
desire to define personhood, recognizing that once personhood is established, 
such a definition would have an impact on concrete practices and judgments 
that can be made regarding actions, treatments, manipulations, and services 
that might be performed to or upon a particular being. There is a recognition 
that personhood, however it is defined, carries with it a (however weak or 
unspecified) notion of respect, dignity, value, or sacredness.
The American legal theorist and philosopher, Ronald Dworkin, makes an 
important contribution to the discussion about the notions of “sacredness” 
or “dignity” in our modern culture, by noticing that a majority of people 
in a pluralistic society would agree, regardless of their radically differing 
fundamental moral systems, that the “life of a human organism has intrinsic 
value in any form it takes, even in the extremely undeveloped form of an 
early, just-implanted embryo”6. Something can have “intrinsic value” due to 
the fact that it is “incrementally valuable” (the more of it we have the better), 
and that which is “sacred or inviolable”. Something is “sacred”, regardless of 
what people happen to “enjoy or want or need,” and this is the kind of value 
4 See J. Fletcher, Four Indicators of Humanhood – The Inquiry Matures. “Hastings Center 
Report” 4 (December 1975): pp. 4–7. He compares and contrasts the “self-awareness” notion of 
Michael Tooley, in which “the real precondition for having a serious right to life...[is] subjectivity 
or self-awareness.” Secondly, Fletcher presents Richard McCormick’s “human relationality” 
theory in which “life is a value to be preserved insofar as it contains some potentiality for human 
relationships”, since the “meaning, substance, and consummation of life is found in human 
relationships”. Third, the “moral happiness” criterion offered by an anonymous pediatrician at 
the Texas Medical Center distinguishes between moral and biological humanity, and places an 
emphasis on the person associated with the ability to express “affectionate responses” and a state 
of “constant euphoria,” as might be seen in a child with mental retardation who is, by all counts, 
“happy”. Fletcher finally presents his own “neo-cortical” indicator that defines personhood as the 
point at which the “cerebral cortex” begins to “synthesize”. There is no “person” without this 
synthesis, “no matter how much the individual’s brain stem and mid-brain may continue to provide 
feelings and regulate autonomic physical functions”.
5 Ibid., p. 378.
6 R. Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual 
Freedom, New York 1993, Alfred A. Knopf, p. 69.
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which most people would assign to human life. Even something considered 
“sacred” by most, however, can still be either “incrementally valuable” or 
“selectively valuable.” When judging the sacred value of human life, we 
perceive each human life as a though we might perceive a work of nature and 
of art, as well as the “product of deliberate human creative force” such as the 
life experiences that have shaped an individual”7.
Having laid out his categories, Dworkin concludes, “The life of a single 
human organism commands respect and protection, then, no matter in what 
form or shape, because of the complex creative investment it represents and 
because of our wonder at the divine or evolutionary processes that produce 
new lives from old ones, at the processes of nation and community and 
language through which a human being will come to absorb and continue 
hundreds of generations and cultures and forms of life and value, and 
finally, when mental life has begun and flourishes, at the process of internal 
personal creation and judgment by which a person will make and remake 
himself, a mysterious, inescapable process in which we each participate, 
and which is therefore the most powerful and inevitable source of empathy 
and communion we have with every other creature who faces the same 
frightening challenge”8.
At first glance, a Catholic theologian committed to the sacred inviolability 
of all human life might agree with Dworkin that human life, in whatever form, 
has an intrinsic value and sacredness that lies outside of itself. However, 
Dworkin proceeds with a social analysis of commonly held positions by 
both “conservatives” and “liberals” (in American society) to show that the 
application of his theory of “sacredness” can be very difficult, especially in the 
“test case” of abortion. For example, with regard to abortion, “conservatives” 
generally make exceptions in the cases of rape, incest, or a threat to the 
health or life of the mother, while “liberals” tend to place more emphasis on 
the freedom and right of the mother to both exert control over her body and 
to not be burdened by an objectively difficult situation that might come about 
as a result of carrying through with the pregnancy. Where somebody draws 
the line depends on whether one accepts the greater relative value of life 
as a “natural investment” (conservatives) or life as a “creative investment” 
7 Ibid., p. 82.
8 Ibid., p. 84.
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(liberals)9. Dworkin characterizes “conservatives” as holding that there are 
possible exceptions to the prohibition on abortion, which leads him (rightly) 
to point out that conservatives would not make exceptions if “the fetus were 
a person with rights and interests of its own, because that person would be 
completely innocent whatever the nature or level of its mothers’ guilt”10.
It becomes apparent that Dworkin’s social analysis of the issue of abortion, 
and the related categories of judging the sacredness of human life based on 
its natural or creative “investments,” lacks a strong notion of personhood. He 
notices that neither liberals nor conservatives seem to cling to a consistent 
understanding of the person, and hence the various degrees of “exceptions” 
based on a relative balance of the natural or creative investments. “So we have 
no formulas for actual decision but only, at best, a schema for understanding 
the arguments and decisions that we and other people make in real life. I have 
argued that we do badly, in understanding and evaluating these decisions and 
arguments, if we try to match them with procrustrean assumptions about fetal 
personhood and rights. We do better to see them as reflecting more nuanced 
and individual judgments about how and why human life is sacred, and about 
which decision of life and death, in all the concrete circumstances, most 
respects what is really important about life”11.
The Catholic bioethicist would agree with Dworkin in many regards, 
including a notion of the “intrinsic” value and sanctity of life, but would 
take issue with his first principles. Underlying his analysis is a rejection of 
9 Interestingly, Dworkin dismisses those who might hold that abortion is wrong without any 
exceptions by calling this an “extreme position” which is accepted only by a “small minority 
of devout Catholics” or “fundamentalists”. It is important to notice that this position is labeled 
“extreme”, rather than the “very conservative” characterization given to those who would hold 
that abortion is only acceptable in cases of rape, incest, or the life of the mother. One might 
ask whether Dworkin, in his analysis of a “spectrum” of opinions, is doing justice to a position 
that seems to play an increasingly important role in debates today: Is the “consistent ethic 
of life” upheld by the Catholic Church, which includes this “extreme” position on abortion, 
simply a radical, fringe opinion that might be discounted as easily as Dworkin seems to assume? 
Is there not, perhaps, a logic operative within it that would seem to go far in explaining the 
“inconsistencies” and “lack of agreement” within the various parties as to the status of the 
person? That is, Dworkin (correctly) notices that “conservatives” reject abortion on the whole, but 
seem to allow exceptions; these “exceptions” cannot indicate that the position has an underlying, 
unqualified, and uniform respect for all human life. (If it did, then they would not allow for any 
exceptions). Might the “extreme” Catholic position provide the consistency that Dworkin seeks, 
however “extreme” it might seem?
10 Ibid., p. 97.
11 Ibid., p. 100.
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the notion of fetal personhood, or treating the fetus as if it were a person 
with a fullness of rights. Based on his “phenomenological” social analysis, 
this conclusion might be justified as a result of the prevailing attitudes in 
modern American society. But what would happen to Dworkin’s argument if 
social attitudes suddenly changed? What if a society commonly accepted that 
abortion is wrong in all situations, with no exceptions? Would his analysis of 
life’s sacredness based on a balance of the creative and natural investments 
still hold? It seems that Dworkin’s analysis needs a more specified notion 
of personhood, and need not too quickly assume that there is a “common 
morality” that all might agree upon.
The American philosopher, Bonnie Steinbock, suggests a more robust notion 
of personhood as necessary for an understanding of the respect that ought to be 
shown to human life. In a discussion of the “respect” due to embryos, Steinbock 
seeks to define personhood in a manner that would uphold Dworkin’s “implicit 
sacredness” without relying as much on the subjective notions present in a given 
society. First, she rejects a notion of personhood that she identifies as the “species 
or genetic humanity view,” which “holds that human embryos are human beings, 
just like you and me. They have all the rights of human beings, including the 
right to life and a general Kantian right not to be used as ‘mere means’ to others’ 
ends”12. She sees within such an approach a confusion of biological and moral 
personhood, and indicates that the view seems to arbitrarily link personhood 
with a particular species. “Why should moral status, rights, and the like be 
limited only to human beings, that is, members of the species homo sapiens? 
Is it not possible that there are non-humans, such as intelligent extraterrestrials, 
who (if they exist) would be entitled to equal respect and rights?”13.
The necessary defining factor of personhood, according to Steinbock, 
ought to take into account sentience and an “identity theory of consciousness”. 
She calls this theory, which accounts for a complicated interplay of factors, 
the “interest view, which “links moral status to interests and restricts interests 
to sentient beings”14. In this view, unless a being has a “conscious awareness 
of some kind, a being does not have a life to lose”. However, the case of 
patients in persistent vegetative states is not excluded from this view, as the 
12 B. Steinbock, Respect for Human Embryos, in: Cloning and the Future of the Human 
Embryo, P. Lauritzin (ed.), Oxford 2001, Oxford University Press, p. 21.
13 Ibid., p. 21.
14 Ibid., p. 23.
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“person who is now unconscious has had a set of beliefs, desires, and interests 
that are compounded out of these beliefs and desires”15. Based on this theory 
of personhood, Steinbock notices that embryos (at least pre-implantation) 
do not have a “life to lose” as they “cannot feel, pain, be hurt, or made to 
suffer”, and there can therefore be no identification between an adult person 
and early gestation fetuses and embryos, since they have no experiences that 
could contribute to shaping their personality. Steinbock therefore agrees with 
Dworkin in noticing that it is important to respect the human embryo, and 
agrees that people might differ with regard to the nature of this respect, and so 
she adopts a minimal position which posits that “our only hope is to formulate, 
as precisely as possible, our views on these symbolic, intangible issues and to 
listen carefully to those who have opposing views”16.
From the above analysis of representatives of central positions in the 
“personhood debate”, there is a clear consensus that human life is sacred 
and has a dignity that is inviolable, although the sacredness and inviolability 
is often determined by the underlying notion of personhood that one holds. 
Of the above authors, only William E. May does not reject a definition of 
biological personhood, and as a Catholic moral theologian, represents 
a particular instantiation of the doctrine held by the Catholic Church. As 
Steinbock notices, the attitudes of the Catholic Church make sense “only if 
one thinks of the pre-implantation embryos as human persons who deserve 
the same respect in death as any other person”17.
2. A Lingering Dualism?
A common characteristic of many of the above non-Catholic personhood 
definitions is a potentially dualistic underpinning. On what basis ought 
we to make decisions about personhood? Are they arbitrary decisions that 
15 Ibid., pp. 23–25.
16 Ibid., p. 33. We can therefore see that both Dworkin’s and Steinbock’s views are deeply 
wedded to the assumptions underlying the liberal, democratic process. Society is assumed to 
be pluralistic and possessing many moral disagreements, and since truth cannot be agreed upon 
objectively, recourse is made to pragmatic and phenomenological discussions focused on both 
reasonably held positions and social experience, and these play a large role in determining the 
concrete norms which ought to be adopted and applied.
17 Ibid., p. 31.
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determine personhood based simply on moral, relational, biological, or mental 
qualities? What role might the body and embodiment play in such discussions? 
The notions of personhood suggested in this analysis seem to result from 
a body-soul, or body-person, dualism that falls within the larger scope of the 
“Baconian project”, or the “technological utopianism” that characterizes the 
state of much of bioethics and medicine today.
The Catholic moral theologian Lisa Cahill notices that “modern science tends 
to build a strictly material body, and locates the causes of its illness and health 
in material causes, tending thereby to erode both the interdependence of the 
spiritual and psychological states, and the connectedness of the embodied self 
with other elements and presences in the cosmos”18. A loss of the vision of the 
person, integrally and adequately considered as a compositum humanum, has led 
to the “reign of informed-consent” in bioethics today, which is a natural result of 
the self that is defined as an “autonomous, private, and self-constituting will”19. 
Such a view, which often results from a separation of “personhood” from “human 
being” and an instrumentalization of the body as a mere “mechanism” or “part” 
of the person, when adopted by either doctors, scientists, or bioethicists, can lead 
to the degradation and denigration of a person or a particular group of people.
Many identify these prevailing views in bioethics, the scientific community, 
and medicine today as a result of the “Baconian project”, characterized by the 
manipulation of nature to serve humanity’s ends. In this project, faith is placed 
in science and “progress”, which is understood as the “triumph of humanity 
over ‘nature’”20. The American Protestant ethicist Gerald McKenny notes the 
origins of such a view in early modernity, particularly in the philosophies of 
René Descartes and Francis Bacon. “Descartes inaugurates the process that 
will... render the mastery of the seeing eye and the intervening hand, while also 
distancing the essential person, the soul, from the body that, despite the power 
of medicine, is destined to decay and die”21. The body-soul dualism of Descartes 
and his followers reduces the body to a machine which is seen as a “property of 
the ‘person’ and the instrument of his desires and preferences”22.
18 L. Cahill, Embodiment and Moral Critique: A Christian Social Perspective, in: Embodiment, 
Morality, and Medicine, L.S. Cahill, M.A. Farley (eds.), Dordrecht 1995, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. See On Moral Medicine, p. 402.
19 Ibid., p. 404.
20 Pope Benedict XVI, Spe salvi, 17.
21 G. McKenny, To Relieve the Human Condition, Albany 1997, SUNY Press, p. 192.
22 Ibid., p. 198.
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McKenny traces the development of Cartesian dualism to show how 
modern medicine and bioethics is characterized by a shift away from “the 
body as object of spiritual and moral practices” to an understanding of the 
body as “object of practices of technological control”23. Debates in bioethics 
today, which often seem to be intractable disputes among parties, could be 
enriched by countering the dominant technological, dualistic approach to the 
body. This attempt ought to be made by becoming “aware of the attitudes and 
practices that have formed us in connection with the technological control 
of medicine over our bodies and to determine which attitudes and practices 
should form us – whether those of modern societies or some others”24.
Lutheran ethicist Gilbert Meilaender agrees with McKenny on the necessity 
to reflect upon the attitudes and practices that might serve as a foundation for 
more fruitful bioethical reflection. “Do we need a moral theory to guide our 
bioethical reflection, or can we make our way from case to case, gradually 
mapping the territory?”25. By reflecting on the limits of such methods as 
“principlism,” Meilaender proposes an “‘integration’ of medical ethics and 
universal morality within a community (or communities) in which there is 
agreement not just on a few general principles but on the meaning of the good 
life”26. Only when there is an agreement on the fundamental meaning of the 
nature of human life, can there be fruitful dialogue about specific issues and 
cases, beneath which lie the “deepest matters of humanity”27.
Both McKenny and Meilaender suggest that the Christian community and 
theological tradition can provide an alternative conception of the person, and 
the associated nature, meaning, and purpose of the human body, in order to 
enhance dialogue within the bioethical community. Bioethics and the shaping 
of public policy will need “inviting back ‘those alternative imaginations’ 
that religious communities and theological traditions provide”28. Within the 
Christian tradition, one can find an appreciation of the body and its meaning 
that might effectively contribute to a discussion in the attempt to move 
23 Ibid., p. 21.
24 Ibid., p. 217.
25 G.C. Meilaender, Body, Soul, and Bioethics. Notre Dame, IN, 1995, University of Notre 
Dame Press, p. 2.
26 Ibid., p. 8.
27 Leon Kass, as quoted in Meilaender, p. 36.
28 Ibid., p. 33. Perhaps Meilaender and Steinbock would agree here, as Steinbock has noted the 
importance of listening to diverse and opposing views (see above).
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beyond the dualism inherent in some modern manifestations of the “Baconian 
project”. “It is... necessary to offer... a description of Christian discourse and 
practices regarding the body that is capable of resisting and appropriating 
technological control of the body... and the limits we should observe in 
improving our bodies and eliminating suffering”29. As Cahill notices, over 
the course of the Catholic tradition, one finds (although with some notable 
exceptions) the “anti-dualism” about the body that is rooted in the Gospels. 
“God’s reign is realized in the life and ministry of a man formed bodily in the 
womb of a woman, a man who in his very walking, sleeping, eating, drinking, 
talking, touching, fasting, night-watching, pain and death makes present the 
compassion of God for human suffering”30. Such a worldview tends toward 
integration rather than dualism, affirmation of the body and the person, rather 
than denigration, and freedom rather than control31.
In order to uphold robust notions of personhood and provide the elements 
lacking in conceptions summarized by Fletcher, Dworkin, or Steinbock, 
whose positions assume body-soul or body-person dualism in one form or 
another, the task for the Catholic bioethicist is two-fold. Catholic bioethicists 
must develop and more adequately understand their own theology of the body, 
as Catholic discourse has not always been immune to the dualism inherent in 
some strands of modern discourse. Secondly, Catholics, formed in their own 
theological understanding of the body, must be able to make philosophical 
arguments in the public square which are formed by the worldview offered by 
theology reflecting on revelation.
3. The Body: Integrated, Self-Giving, Revelatory
Having examined the deficiencies of some current notions of personhood, 
resulting from the tendency in modern bioethics to separate a discussion of 
personhood from the discussion of the body, and an inquiry into the nature 
of the body as such, it is necessary to turn to a “theology of the body” that 
can provide one example of a “discourse... that is capable of resisting and 
29 G. McKenny, To Relieve the Human Condition, Albany 1997, SUNY Press, p. 219.
30 L. Cahill, Embodiment and Moral Critique: A Christian Social Perspective, p. 402.
31 Ibid., p. 405.
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appropriating technological control of the body”32. This discussion will 
draw from Catholic sources, and cannot therefore be addressed directly to 
secular philosophers and bioethicists. However, an Incarnational “theology 
of the body” sustained by the liturgical life and worldview of the Church can 
provide a necessary locus of formation within which Catholic bioethicists can 
develop an integral vision of the person, including the body, and from which 
they can begin to develop philosophical reflections and arguments that can be 
addressed to the secular sphere.
In beginning to sketch a Catholic theology of the body, it is important to 
recall the plurality of “theologies of the body” in the tradition33. I will limit 
my discussion to Pope John Paul II’s one hundred twenty nine catecheses, Man 
and Women He Created Them, since there have been several recent attempts 
to evaluate and relate these catecheses to bioethics34. It is important to begin 
by noticing that John Paul II did not intend these catecheses to be directly 
related to the field of bioethics. As David Bentley Hart points out, John Paul 
II’s “theology of the body” does not “offer discrete logical propositions or 
policy recommendations” that might be extracted from the larger context of 
his teachings so as to “advance the conversation” or “suggest a middle course” 
or “clarify ethical ambiguities”35. Robert Jenson also agrees that there are not 
“many explicit answers to particular bioethical problems”36. Hart suggests 
rather that at the “heart of its anthropology is a complete rejection – one might 
almost say, ignorance – of any dualism between flesh and spirit”37.
32 G. McKenny, To Relieve the Human Condition, Albany 1997, SUNY Press, p. 219.
33 The literature is vast, and it is, of course, beyond of the scope of this paper to provide a survey 
of theological approaches to the body in the Christian tradition. Some theological methods might 
include Christological theologies of the body, feminist theologies of the body and embodiment, 
phenomenological theologies of the body, sociological theologies of the body, etc. Cf. B. Ashley, 
Theologies of the Body: Humanist and Christian, Braintree, MA, 1995, The Pope John Center. 
P. Brown, The Body in Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity, New 
York 1998, Columbia University Press. A. Vogel, Body Theology: God’s Presence in Man’s World, 
New York 1973, Harper and Row.
34 Cf. R.W. Jenson, Reading the Body, The New Atlantis, (Summer 2005): 73–82. D.B. Hart, The 
Anti-Theology of the Body, The New Atlantis (Summer 2005), p. 64–73. M.F. Rousseau, Deriving 
Bioethical Norms from the Theology of the Body, in: National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly (Spring 
2003), pp. 59–67.
35 D.B. Hart, The Anti-Theology of the Body, The New Atlantis (Summer 2005), p. 65.
36 R.W. Jenson, Reading the Body, The New Atlantis, (Summer 2005), p. 73.
37 D.B. Hart, The Anti-Theology of the Body, The New Atlantis (Summer 2005), p. 66.
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John Paul II begins each section of his series of reflections with the words 
of Christ in the Gospels, particularly Christ’s encounters with different groups 
of interlocutors such as the Pharisees and the Sadducees, as well as with the 
writings of St. Paul. From his analysis of these sections of the New Testament, 
he argues that “the Christian ethos is characterized by a...“communion of 
persons”, which is the deepest substratum of human ethics and culture. While 
for the Manichean mentality, the body and sexuality constitute, so to speak, 
an “anti-value”, for Christianity, on the contrary, they always “remain a value 
not sufficiently appreciated”38.
Rather than condemning or denigrating the body, or emphasizing the 
spiritual over the physical, the Catholic tradition upholds a vision of the 
person, considered in her proper integrity and fullness. “The Manichean 
way of understanding and evaluating man’s body and sexuality is essentially 
foreign to the Gospel; it does not conform to the exact meaning of the words 
in the Sermon on the Mount pronounced by Christ”39. Having begun with 
the words and encounters of Christ, John Paul II uses Christ’s reference to 
“the beginning” in his discussion with the Pharisees regarding divorce, and 
sees this as Christ’s reference to the creation of man and woman in the first 
two chapters of the book of Genesis40. He therefore begins with an analysis 
of the human condition according to God’s “original plan of creation,” in 
which the human person was created in a state of body-soul integrity, and the 
temptation of treating another with a utilitarian attitude was not present41. 
He identifies four notions as characteristic of the prelapsarian state: original 
solitude, original unity, original innocence, and original nakedness, which he 
develops through phenomenological or “psychological” cross-readings of the 
38 Man and Woman, 45:3. L. Cahill also shows how the affirmative Christian ethos of the 
body is present in Christianity, not only in the New Testament, but also through the examples of 
the Church Fathers and medieval women mystics. “Christianity has been neither intransigently 
dualistic nor negative about the body. They [these figures in the tradition] also indicate that 
a positive, integrated approach to the body and soul, or body and mind, need not exclude – indeed 
may depend on – an ordering of the body related to a social vision... Christianity both channels 
a social vision through the body, and defines community partly in terms of bodily experiences and 
roles”. L. Cahill, Embodiment and Moral Critique: A Christian Social Perspective, pp. 407–408.
39 MW, 45:5.
40 See Mt. 19:3–8. For a systematic treatment of the structure of John Paul II’s catecheses, 
see M. Waldstein, Introduction in John Paul II, Man and Women He Created Them, M. Waldstein 
(trans.), Boston, 2006, Pauline Publishers, pp. 106–128.
41 For a full account of his rejection of utilitarianism, see K. Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, 
San Francisco 1993, Ignatius Press, pp. 21–40.
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two creation accounts42. Three main themes that emerge from John Paul II’s 
analysis can be helpful in relation to the current argument.
First, John Paul II’s reflections strongly presuppose a unity of biological, 
physical, and moral personhood within one human nature. The corporeal nature 
of the human being is inseparable from his nature as “person”. The notion 
of “original solitude” presents the human person “alone” in his humanity in 
all of creation as “in a unique, exclusive, and unrepeatable relationship with 
God himself”, with a subjectivity that characterizes the person43. Unlike 
other animals, the human person is marked with self-consciousness and self-
determination, which includes the “consciousness of one’s body... the discovery 
of the complexity of one’s structure”44. Following the Genesis accounts (in this 
case, the second creation account), humanity is also characterized by “original 
unity,” upon discovery of the “definitive creation” of woman. Unity refers both 
to the unity of human nature, and to the call to union of man and woman. 
“The fact that man is a ‘body’ belongs more deeply to the structure of the 
personal subject than the fact that in his somatic constitution he is also male or 
female”45. Man and woman emerge from “the mystery of creation first of all as 
brother and sister in the same humanity”46. Being a “body” takes precedence 
and is prior to being instantiated as male or female.
In John Paul II’s account, the human being is a body, and does not “have 
a body”, or is not “in a body”. Any attempt that would refer to the “many 
partial conceptions that dwell on one or another aspect of the compositum 
humanum but do not reach man’s integrum or leave it outside the field of 
vision”47 would not do justice to the scriptural account. What is at stake in 
42 He recognizes, of course, the insights of historical-critical scholarship that place the accounts 
in vastly differing contexts and times. Nevertheless, a central assumption that governs his method 
is the unity of the scriptures in their ability to express the truth about the human condition. See 
MW, 1–3. For some insights into John Paul II’s method of scriptural exegesis, see John Paul II, 
Address to the Pontifical Biblical Commission, 7 IV 1989.
43 Ibid., 5:6, 6:2.
44 Ibid., 6:1, 7:1.
45 Ibid., 8:1.
46 Ibid., 18:5. Emphasis added. Notice the similarity between John Paul II’s statement “man 
is a body” and Rudolph Bultmann, For Paul, “the soma is not something that outwardly clings to 
a man’s real self (to his soul, for instance), but belongs to his very essence, so that we can say that 
man does have a soma; he is a soma”. R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, vol. 1, New 
York, 1951, Scribner’s.
47 Ibid., 23:3.
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John Paul II’s affirmation of the human being as a body? Rather than offering 
a view of the person that emphasizes the soul or spiritual over the material, 
or which allows the material body to be seen as an “other” or a “part”, John 
Paul II’s understanding allows him to place great emphasis on the ability of 
the body to “speak a language”.
This second characteristic of John Paul II’s account, in addition to 
rejecting a split between moral, psychological, and biological personhood 
and the body, presupposes the body’s revelatory power. In his discussion of 
original unity and nakedness, he draws insights from Gen. 2:23–25. The body, 
the pope argues, reveals the person. “This concise formula already contains 
all that human science will be able to say about the structure of the body as 
an organism, about its vitality, about its sexual physiology, etc. In this first 
expression of the man, ‘flesh from my flesh’ contains also a reference to that 
by which that body is authentically human and thus to that which determines 
man as a person... a being that is, also in all its bodiliness, ‘similar’ to God”48. 
John Paul identifies within the body a “spousal meaning”, that is “the power to 
express love: precisely that love in which the human person becomes gift and 
– through this gift – fulfills the very meaning of his being and existence”49. 
The human body, in its structure and nature, reveals the ethical demand placed 
upon the person to become the gift for another50.
In addition to revealing the nature of the relationship that ought to 
characterize one’s stance toward another, the body also reveals something 
of the nature of God. “The body, in fact, and only the body, is capable of 
making visible what is invisible: the spiritual and the divine. It has been 
created to transfer into the visible reality of the world the mystery hidden 
from eternity in God, and thus to be a sign of it”51. The body is a “primordial 
sacrament”, understood as a “sign that efficaciously transmits in the visible 
48 Ibid., 9:3.
49 Ibid., 15:1.
50 The “spousal meaning” of the body is therefore not limited to conjugal self-giving through 
sexual union. The spousal meaning of the body is also lived in the vocation to celibacy, for example, 
as the celibate person has offered a gift of his or her person to God in order to freely serve others. 
The “spousal meaning” therefore carries a primary, existential sense that is not bound to or limited 
in scope by its relation to sexual self-giving. On John Paul II’s view, even a single person, not living 
within the vows of the religious or married life, might still be living the “spousal meaning” revealed 
by the body through her dedication to her work, her friends, her Church, community, and society if 
in each of these spheres she enacted self-giving love and dedication to the good of others.
51 Ibid., 19:4.
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world the mystery hidden from God in eternity... the mystery of Truth and 
Love, the mystery of divine life, in which man really participates”52. Through 
the sacramental nature of the body one discerns the invitation to participate 
in the eternal exchange of love between the three persons of the Trinity53. 
The body therefore witnesses to “creation as a fundamental gift... to Love as 
the source from which this same giving springs”54. Gratitude, reverence, and 
awe characterize the worldview that ought to result from these reflections. 
The body, in its very materiality, witnesses to the immanent Trinity and the 
calling to “become partakers of divine nature”55.
The invitation to participate in the love of the Trinity is made possible by 
Christ. Thus the third and most fundamental element in this theology of the 
body, in which the body is recognized as a sacrament that reveals both God, 
and the human person’s true calling to participate in the love of God through 
self-gift, is its Christocentric and Incarnational basis. One of the most cited 
sections of the Second Vatican Council in these catecheses is Gaudium et 
spes, 22. “The truth is that only in the mystery of the incarnate Word does the 
mystery of man take on light. For Adam, the first man, was a figure of Him 
Who was to come, namely Christ the Lord. Christ, the final Adam, by the 
revelation of the mystery of the Father and His love, fully reveals man to man 
himself and makes his supreme calling clear”56.
Jesus Christ is the final revelation of the meaning, purpose, and destiny of 
the human person, including the body. “The fact that theology also includes the 
body should not astonish or surprise anyone who is conscious of the mystery 
and reality of the Incarnation. Through the fact that the Word of God became 
flesh, the body entered theology... through the main door”57. Thus, if Christians 
52 Ibid.
53 Traditional theological categories would identify this as perichoresis, or the mutual 
indwelling of the Father, Son, and Spirit who exist in a relationship of self-giving love to one 
another. Cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, VIII.10.14.
54 Ibid., 14:4.
55 2 Pet. 1:4.
56 Gaudium et spes, 22.
57 MW, 23:4. In this statement, it is clear that John Paul II’s understanding of anthropology 
and Christology has parallels with that of Bernard Häring, C.Ss.R, who writes, “So deep is our 
conviction that the doctrine about man in moral theology (anthropology) must be studied in the 
light of Christology that it seems to us to be in a measure an actual part of Christology. Let us 
note that if we are to understand man who is called by Christ, this is possibly only in light of Him 
who calls. Our study of man is not just man, but man as created in the Word of the Father, who is 
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hold to a robust Chalcedonian Christology of one person-two natures, in which 
the Second Person of the Trinity, without any loss to itself, took upon itself all 
that is required of human nature (including the body) and came to authentically 
express it, Christians cannot denigrate the value of the human body, to which 
divinity is united in Christ. For John Paul II, this Christocentric affirmation of 
the value of the human body forms the heart of his method.
The self-giving love of Christ throughout his life, death, and resurrection 
forms the basis for the call to love as Christ loved. The ethic of love as self-
gift therefore results from John Paul II’s analysis of Christ’s words and the 
Genesis account. Again referencing the Second Vatican Council, John Paul 
points out, “One can understand this ‘spousal meaning’ of the human body 
only in the context of the person. The body has a spousal meaning because the 
human person, as the Council says, is a creature that God willed for its own 
sake and that, at the same time, cannot fully find himself except through the 
gift of self. (GS, 24:3)”58.
The spousal meaning of the body, that is, the existential truth that the 
human person exists for self-giving love, urges one to build a communio 
personarum on earth, which is itself a reflection of the Trinitarian love of 
God. A society characterized by such communio would radically counter 
an understanding of the person in society as an autonomous individual with 
subjective rights, who must safeguard these from an encroachment upon 
others, usually through a utilitarian calculation of his own good, or the 
benefit of the society. The vision given by John Paul II in his catecheses can 
lead to “solidarity, openness to others, and service to them”59 and promote 
the “highest levels of human value and accomplishment, such as love and 
friendship...”60. The integral vision offered here is that of the “peace of the 
interior gaze” that is characterized by the “simplicity and fullness of vision 
in which [an] understanding of the meaning of the body is born from the very 
heart... of community-communion”61.
Christ”. See B. Häring, The Law of Christ, 1:61. As found in K.A. Cahalan, Formed in the Image 
of Christ: The Sacramental-Moral Theology of Bernard Haring, C.Ss.R, Collegeville, MN, 2004, 
The Liturgical Press, 2004.
58 Ibid., 15:5.
59 John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, 19.
60 L. Cahill, Embodiment and Moral Critique: A Christian Social Perspective,..., p. 405.
61 Ibid., 13:1.
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4. The Human Body and the Body of Christ
The understanding of the spousal dimension of the body-person and its 
sacramentality ought to be fostered in the life of the Church through the 
theologia prima of the liturgy: as both the “source and the summit of the 
Christian life,” the Church’s public proclamation is based on the liturgy as the 
source of moral formation62. If Catholics seek to “do” a Catholic bioethics, they 
must first take into adequate account the liturgical basis for understanding the 
body, and therefore the person63. The liturgy is the practice par excellence that 
sustains a proper vision of the body and the person, in relation to the entire 
order of the cosmos and all of creation, which radically undercuts a utilitarian 
or technological view that brings with it a desire to dominate, manipulate, and 
control nature as a result of the notion of “progress,” driven by a desire to 
overcome the human condition. Brent Waters argues that the, “finitude entailed 
in our status as embodied creatures is not merely an unfortunate limit to be 
overcome but defines and delineates the normative shape and pattern of human 
life within the dictates of temporal necessity. Why else would the Word who 
became flesh share in the most common experiences of birth and death? And 
why else the need for a crucified reconciler, resurrected savior, and exalted lord 
as the instrument of creation’s vindication and redemption?”64.
It is within the liturgy that the Word made flesh, Christ the reconciler, savior, 
and Lord is encountered. Christ, the Word made flesh, sustains, strengthens, 
62 Cf. Lumen Gentium, 11. I borrow the term “theologia prima” from D. Fagerberg, Theologia 
Prima: What is Liturgical Theology?, Chicago 2004, Hillenbrand Books. While he defines theolgia 
prima in many ways, perhaps the notion that is most pertinent here is “something that comes at the 
end of an ascetical journey as an effect of holiness”, which requires an understanding of leitourgia 
as “something more than the thin business of discovering how to creatively use liturgy, banners, 
and stoles”. p. 110. The following discussion will show that a “liturgical theology” concerns those 
practices and rituals that shape the Christian as a moral agent, whose life is seen to have its origins 
and end in the Trinitarian God, and whose actions either assist her or disable her from making the 
entirety of life a “spiritual worship” pleasing and “acceptable to God” (Rom. 12:1).
63 It is beyond the current argument, of course, to derive specific “norms” for bioethics, or 
discuss in detail the application of a “liturgical worldview” to the concrete ethical arguments 
that bioethics faces. Rather, I seek to argue that the liturgical worldview of the Church needs 
to a priori already order a bioethicist to adopting or rejecting particular views as incompatible 
with the purpose and destiny of the body-person. The liturgy contains within its rites, structure, 
and enactment, in texts of prayers, body postures, tangible signs, etc. what ought to motivate the 
entirety of a Christian bioethicist’s discussions.
64 B. Waters, This Mortal Flesh: Incarnation and Bioethics, Grand Rapids, MI, 2009, Brazos 
Press, p. 129.
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and forms the Church at her source. As Susan and Gregory Jones point out, 
“Christian worship provides a site for reclaiming the sense that all of us... are 
creatures made in the image and likeness of God, destined for communion 
with God, and worthy of participation in the praise of God”65. The vision of 
communion based on self-gift offered by John Paul II’s theology of the body 
is sustained and practiced within liturgical worship. Yet, in what sense must 
“liturgical worship” and a “liturgical worldview” be understood?66.
The liturgical nature and vocation of the Church encompasses all other 
dimensions of the Church’s existence and work on earth. “For the liturgy... 
is the outstanding means whereby the faithful may express in their lives, 
and manifest to others, the mystery of Christ and the real nature of the true 
Church”67. The authentic nature of the Church is made manifest through the 
Church’s liturgical rites, of which the Eucharist stands as the “the summit 
toward which the activity of the Church is directed; at the same time it is the 
font from which all her power flows”68. The Eucharist is “constitutive of the 
Church’s being and activity”69. Orthodox theologian Alexander Schmemann 
points out that it is precisely in and through her liturgy that “the Church is 
informed of her cosmic and eschatological vocation, receives the power to 
fulfill it and thus truly becomes ‘what she is’ – the sacrament, in Christ, of the 
new creation; the sacrament, in Christ, of the Kingdom”. The liturgy makes 
the Church the “realm of grace and communion with God, of new knowledge 
and new life”70.
65 S. Pendleton-Jones and L.G. Jones, Worship, the Eucharist, Baptism, and Aging, in: Growing 
Old in Christ, S. Hauerwas, C. Bailey Stoneking, K.G. Meador, D. Cloutier (eds.), Grand Rapids, 
MI, 2003, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, p. 187. While the Jones’ are not Catholic, 
the ecumenical nature of liturgical studies in the United States justifies the inclusion of this source, 
as well as other non-Catholic authors who reflect on the liturgy. Insofar as we are limiting the 
meaning of “liturgy” to a narrow sense referring to the Catholic Eucharist, then these authors 
do not refer to the same type of worship. However, if by “liturgy” we mean the public action 
and worship of Christians (broadly conceived), then such references and arguments will be found 
helpful for the purposes of this essay.
66 I do not hope to provide here a comprehensive theology of the Eucharist, but by outlying 
a basic structure, hope to expand the meaning of “liturgy” to encompass more than just the 
liturgical rites.
67 Sacrosanctum concilium, 2.
68 Ibid., 10.
69 Pope Benedict XVI, Sacramentum caritatis, 15.
70 A. Schmemann, Liturgy and Tradition, Thomas Fisch (ed.), Crestwood, NY, 2003, St. 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, pp. 57–58.
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Within the liturgy, the People of God, forming the Body of Christ, are 
sanctified “by means of signs perceptible to the senses”71, and it is within the 
Eucharist that we “become one with God, and one with one another; this is 
how we are re-membered to God, and to one another; this is how the Church 
becomes the body of Christ”72. The American Catholic ethicist M. Therese 
Lysaught, in her discussion of the importance of funeral rites for fostering the 
proper understanding of the body and person, argues, “The rites locate our 
lives and deaths within the context of Christ’s death and resurrection... the 
resurrection of the body. For Christians, this is... a claim that our bodies are 
an integral part of who we are. The resurrection affirms that God will raise 
us to new life. ‘Us’, – not some disembodied spirits, but the full persons he 
knew, loved, and saved. It is a claim that God’s grace is mediated through the 
material: in the Incarnation, God became human flesh and dwelt among us; in 
the Passion, it was Christ’s body that was crucified; in the Eucharist, Christ 
is fully present in the elements of the bread and wine; as we partake of these 
elements, approaching the altar with our bodies, eating and drinking, we 
become the very body of Christ; and in the eschaton, it is the very materiality 
of creation that God will transform and glorify”73.
For this reason, a Eucharistic preface can affirm, “For you so loved the 
world that in your mercy you sent us the Redeemer, to live like us in all things 
but sin, so that you might love in us what you loved in your Son”74. It is within 
the liturgical rites, with the Eucharist at the center, that we “discern ourselves, 
the church, and the world – indeed all of life and reality – as formed by the 
Gospel”75. The liturgy forms Catholics to develop a “liturgical worldview,” 
which must be continued outside of the short time during which the community 
gathers for Eucharistic celebration. “Cult, liturgy in the proper sense, is part 
of this worship, but so too is life according to the will of God; such a life is 
71 Pius XII, Mediator Dei, 22. See Smith, p. 22.
72 H.L. Smith, Where Two or Three are Gathered: Liturgy and the Moral Life, Cleveland, OH, 
1995, The Pilgrim Press, p. 65.
73 M.T. Lysaught, Memory, Funerals, and the Communion of Saints: Growing Old and 
Practices of Remembering, in: Growing Old in Christ, p. 286.
74 See the “Roman Missal”, Preface for Sundays of the Year, VII.
75 H.L. Smith, Where Two or Three are Gathered: Liturgy and the Moral Life, Cleveland, 
OH, 1995, The Pilgrim Press, p. 70. Jones and Jones make a very similar point, “We learn through 
worship, through prayer and praise of God, that our identity as persons and our hope for the future 
are shaped by God’s memory and hope manifested in Jesus Christ”, pp. 195–196.
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an indispensible part of true worship... is the very life of man, man himself as 
living righteously”76.
During the opening of the Pauline Year, Benedict XVI prayed that all 
Christians might “become true liturgists of Jesus Christ”77. He sees in Romans 
12 an understanding of the cosmic dimension of the liturgical worldview. Paul 
“knows he is called... in the priestly service of the Gospel of God, so that the 
offering of the Gentiles may be acceptable, sanctified by the Holy Spirit.” 
Paul’s daily hardships, toils, suffering, and joys are all means by which he 
offers his life and the life of those whom he serves to God in an act of liturgical 
worship. “When the world in all its parts has become a liturgy of God, when, 
in its reality, it has become adoration, then it will have reached its goal and 
will be safe and sound”78.
It is necessary to re-acquire a liturgical worldview in order not only that the 
Eucharist might be understood at the center of the Church, but also at the center 
and heart of each individual’s life and action. If this worldview is recovered, 
then “Christianity’s new worship [will] include and transfigure every aspect of 
life”79. In a field characterized by instrumental and technocratic reason and 
ambivalence about the notion of the person, it is necessary to gain an integrated 
understanding of the human person and its relation to God, the Church, and 
the world. “The worship of God in our lives cannot be relegated to something 
private and individual, but tends by its nature to permeate every aspect of our 
existence. Worship pleasing to God thus becomes a new way of living our 
whole life, each particular moment of which is lifted up, since it is lived as part 
of a relationship with Christ and as an offering to God”80.
Thus, in order to understand the vocation of the Catholic bioethicist as 
a participation in and particular manifestation of the Church’s role in offering 
worship to God, worship must be understood as more than simply a liturgical 
rite. Rather, a liturgical worldview regards concrete human decisions and 
the moral life. It presupposes an understanding of the human being as part 
of the created world, and yet not “of it.” Ratzinger argues that “we have to 
76 J. Ratzinger, Spirit of the Liturgy, San Francisco 2000, Ignatius Press, p. 17.
77 Pope Benedict XVI, Homily for the Feast of Sts. Peter and Paul, 29 VI, 2008. Presumably, 
this would include Christian bioethicists.
78 Ibid.
79 Pope Benedict XVI, Sacramentum caritatis, 70.
80 Ibid., 71.
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recapture this cosmic vision if we want once again to understand and live 
Christianity in its full breadth”81. Catholics must recapture a vision of created 
reality as a gratuitous gift from God, and of the human person, in particular, 
as a microcosm of the universe82. Humanity exists in relation to the cosmos, 
and yet belongs especially to God through the call to communion with, and in 
imitation of, the self-giving love of the Trinity, a God who creates, redeems, and 
sanctifies. Indeed, “true liturgical action is the deed of God, and for this very 
reason the liturgy of faith always reaches beyond the cultic act into everyday 
life, which must itself become liturgical, a ‘service’ for the transformation of 
the world”83. The liturgical life must be a life in the Spirit, which recognizes 
the action of God and the response of the human person.
In a particular way, the liturgy and the resulting liturgical worldview trains 
Catholics to see their bodies and persons as “temples of the Holy Spirit”84. Sr. 
Mary Timothy Prokes points out, “This underscores the extraordinary dignity 
of the human body as a sacred place of worship, although it may be desecrated 
from within or without. For those who are united to Christ in the Holy Spirit, 
the body is a living, mobile location of prayer, a living monstrance of Christ”85. 
Prokes draws upon Teilhard de Chardin to show that “our bodies are not part 
of the universe that we possess totally, but the whole of the universe that we 
possess partially,” and therefore one who is aware of this relation of the body 
to the universe is able to “bring the entire universe to praise”86. The Catholic, 
who understands her body as part of a universe that has been redeemed by 
Christ and His body, and continues to be sustained by the body of Christ, the 
Church, recognizes the necessity of “praying the body”.
To “pray the body” presupposes its goodness, worthiness to be offered and 
acceptability to God as a means by which God is adored and praised. “To ‘pray 
the body’ requires a prior capacity to receive embodiment as a gift of love. The 
‘prayed body’ integrates reverence, a sacred freedom (which ascetical theology 
has traditionally called ‘detachment,’) and the offering of the embodied self as 
81 J. Ratzinger, Spirit of the Liturgy, San Francisco 2000, Ignatius Press, p. 101.
82 Such a notion is present in many of the Church Fathers, particularly Maximus the Confessor. 
See A. Louth, Maximus the Confessor, London 1998, Routeledge, pp. 61–63.
83 Ibid., p. 175.
84 1 Cor. 6:19. Cf. M.T. Prokes, Toward a Theology of the Body, Grand Rapids, 1996, Eerdmans, 
p. 135.
85 Ibid., p. 135.
86 M.T. Prokes, Toward a Theology of the Body, Grand Rapids, 1996, Eerdmans, p. 136.
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gift”87. The ability for the Catholic to “pray the body” and offer the embodied 
self as gift is based on Christ’s Paschal self-offering, continued in the liturgy. 
“Christ’s personal self-gift in the body and blood is the prime reference for 
understanding every human potential for bodily self-gift”88. Paul encourages 
the early Christian communities to pray always and without ceasing89. This 
“extension of liturgical prayer in home and marketplace takes it meaning from 
the same source – body as expression of self-gift”90.
The Catholic liturgical view of the body therefore counters any “worshipful 
attitude which... treats the earth as the ultimate reality,” and also stands firmly 
against a “utilitarian perspective, extending scientific/technical ingenuity to 
the re-creation of the earth and its inhabitants according to the insights of 
the present age”91. Leitourgia, both in its cultic sense and its broad sense, 
provides the practice par excellence that sustains a theology of the body 
that proposes the human body-person as a revelatory gift from God, while 
at the same time seeking to understand the truth of personhood considered 
integrally and adequately. Thus, D.B. Hart, a non-Catholic theologian, even 
comments that John Paul II’s theology of the body is a “monument to the 
grandeur and fullness of [Christian] ‘total humanism’”, a reminder of “how 
vast the Christian understanding of humanity’s nature and destiny is,” and 
an inspiration to reject any “philosophy, ethics, or science that would reduce 
human life to an instrumental moment within some larger design”92.
5. Liturgical Worldview in Practice
The question remains: how does this theological understanding of the body, 
sustained in the liturgical practices and liturgical worldview of the community 
and Church, affect the Catholic bioethicist? It is necessary to recall the two-
fold task of the Catholic bioethicist, and relate it to several modest proposals. 
First, she must be Catholic, which means that she must draw from, develop, 
87 Ibid., p. 137.
88 Ibid., p. 144.
89 Cf. Col. 1:3; Col. 4:2; 1 Thess. 1:2; 1 Thess. 5:17; 2 Tim. 1:3.
90 Prokes., p. 145.
91 Ibid.
92 D.B. Hart, The Anti-Theology of the Body, The New Atlantis (Summer 2005), p. 73.
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and immerse herself more deeply in the theological inquiries and liturgical 
life of the Church, in order not to lose sight of the great value of the person, 
including the affirmation of the body, which is missing from many of the 
contemporary personhood debates, as we have noted in the beginning of this 
article. This task itself requires intellectual and doctrinal formation, as well 
as liturgical and sacramental participation. While it is a minimal requirement 
to “intellectually value” the corporeal person for the sake of articulating 
philosophical positions, it is much harder to live out the calling of human 
corporality, being created out of love and for love, and called to participate 
in the divine life. This calling is upheld through the texts of the liturgy, the 
central feast days of the liturgical calendar, the commemorations of saints, 
and the various ascetical practices associated closely with particular seasons93. 
Thus, the Catholic bioethicist, who usually dwells in a very specialized and 
often secular discipline, will be immersed in and draw from the wellsprings 
of the worldview embodied in the living communion of the Church. 
In addition, this liturgical worldview ought to be fostered through 
catechetical formation, particularly through an understanding of the rites, 
seasons, language, types, symbols and gestures themselves. The formation 
of such a worldview can begin in the family that is a basic instantiation of 
the communio personarum to which society is called. “The Christian family 
constitutes a specific revelation and realization of ecclesial communion, and 
for this reason too it can and should be called ‘the domestic Church’”94. Parents 
ought to educate and form children from a young age about the value and 
93 After all, aren’t some of the central Christian feasts about the body: the Annunciation and 
Incarnation of Christ, the Nativity, the Bodily Resurrection, the Ascension, the Assumption, 
and the Immaculate Conception? Each of these central feasts in the Catholic liturgical calendar 
depends on the body. Saints, in particular, the martyrs, remind the Church of the powerful witness 
made by offering one’s body unto death out of love for God, the Church, or moral truths. Ascetical 
practices such as fasting are not masochistic denigrations of the body, but hinge upon a unity of 
the integrated person: it is precisely through fasting, a bodily practice, that one can grow in greater 
spiritual union with Christ, develop habits of detachment and temperance, and grow in love for 
one’s neighbor, particularly the poor or suffering. Tertullian shows beautifully how the liturgical 
rites of the Church uphold the integrity of the Christian vision: “To such a degree is the flesh the 
pivot of salvation, that since by it the soul becomes linked with God, it is the flesh which makes 
possible the soul’s election by God. For example, the flesh is washed that the soul may be made 
spotless: the flesh is anointed that the soul may be consecrated: the flesh is signed <with the cross> 
that the soul too may be protected: the flesh is overshadowed by the imposition of the hand that the 
soul may be illumined by the Spirit: the flesh feeds on the Body and Blood of Christ so that the soul 
also may be replete with God”. See De Resurrectione, E. Evans (ed.), London 1960: S.P.C.K.
94 John Paul II, Familiaris Consortio, 21.
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goodness of creation and the body. Outside the communion of the family, 
such formation ought to be undertaken by pastors and lay ministers during 
heightened times of interaction with parishioners, such as marriage preparation 
programs, funerals, baptismal preparations, and confirmation classes95. 
Secondly, having allowed herself to be formed by the liturgical practices 
and worldview of the Church, the task of the Catholic bioethicist is to develop 
a vocabulary, concepts, logic, and philosophy that is capable of engaging the 
field of bioethics and medicine in a manner that does not sacrifice fundamental 
Catholic commitments to the “total humanism” of this vision, while at the 
same time being able to articulate positions which might appeal to those who 
are outside of the Church, as is increasingly the reality in bioethics today96. In 
addition to dialogue with secular philosophers and ethicists, it would be fruitful 
for the Catholic bioethicist to carry on discourse with liturgical theologians who 
are both Catholic and non-Catholic Christians. As Smith notes, to “suggest that 
[ethics and liturgy] are autonomous, independent, separable entities which now, 
by some contrivance, need to be or can be brought into some sort of relation” is 
based on the presupposition that the two branches of theology are not related. 
However, “prayer, proclamation, baptism, eucharist, offering, intercession – 
all of these and more are moral acts because they display the kind of people 
we are”97. While recognizing the importance of “specializations” in theology 
and ethics, it is also important therefore to recognize that all these branches 
of theology are in pursuit of understanding and articulating the truth, which 
finds its origin in the same source. Of course liturgical scholars will not usually 
write about feeding tubes and cloning, and bioethicists will not write about the 
Eucharist, but shouldn’t those who write about human life maintain dialogue 
with those who study the “source and summit” of the Christian life? 
Liturgical scholars can remind bioethicists of the liturgy as the moral locus 
of formation, and the importance of a “liturgical life”. They need to remind 
95 Sacramental formation is an ideal time during which to elucidate the dignity of the body. 
Tangible signs are used (bread, wine, water, rings, oil, chrism, etc.) and actions are performed 
upon or by a body (immersion, imposition, reception, anointing, etc.) in order to effect a spiritual, 
invisible reality.
96 The articulation of a philosophy and categories that might remain faithful to the Christian 
vision presented here, and appeal to a secular audience, is of course beyond the scope of this paper. 
One such attempt is made by M.F. Rousseau, Deriving Bioethical Norms from the Theology of the 
Body, in: National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, (Spring 2003): pp. 59–67.
97 H.L. Smith, Where Two or Three are Gathered: Liturgy and the Moral Life, Cleveland, OH, 
1995, The Pilgrim Press, p. 37.
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and invite bioethicists, whose field can often be dominated by the paradigmatic 
discourses of secularity, that the Church’s vision has much to contribute. Since 
much bioethical discourse revolves around “cases” and disputed questions, or 
challenges in light of new developments in technology and science, without 
losing sight of the importance of these questions, the Catholic bioethicist 
must nevertheless bring the liturgical vision of the human person to bear on 
fundamental questions, such as personhood and the truth and meaning of 
human life98. Bioethicists, on the other hand, can help liturgical scholars see 
the importance of their work outside their intra-ecclesial discipline. A Catholic 
bioethicist, the heart of whose work is formed in a liturgical view that seeks to 
promote a vision of the person, integrally and adequately considered, provides 
a concrete example of how the work of liturgical scholars can contribute to the 
formation of those outside their field. Liturgical scholars, rather than simply 
focusing on historical studies about the development of rites, will recognize 
what is at stake in being formed by the Church’s liturgy, and will remember 
that they ought to provide the “grammar” for those, such as bioethicists, whose 
job will be to use that grammar to develop a language to promote the vision 
sustained in and through the Church into their increasingly secular fields.
While these proposals are modest, and do not offer definitive solutions 
to often complex discussions in bioethics, they uphold a commitment to the 
fundamental affirmation of the human body and the integral consideration of the 
person within the Christian community, and specifically that account offered by 
John Paul II’s catecheses on the theology of the body. These proposals can serve 
as a basis for a fruitful and necessary beginning for the Catholic bioethicist to 
bring about the solidarity, openness to others and service to them that remains 
as a fundamental commitment in many of the problems medical and bioethics 
faces today. It is a reminder that, prior to answering the question of “what kind 
of bioethicist shall I be”, the Catholic bioethicist must first answer the question, 
“What kind of Catholic shall I be”?
98 The state of much bioethical debate today can be summarized by A. Smith-Iltis: “Bioethics 
is not about theory. Bioethics cannot be about theory because there is no universally agreed 
upon and recognized theory of right and wrong.” Smith-Iltis, A., Bioethics as Methodological 
Case Resolution: Specification, Specified Principlism and Casuistry, Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy, 25, No. 3, p. 272. It is precisely against such an assessment of the state of affairs that 
the Catholic bioethicist ought to enter into dialogue in order to show the ever-present importance 
of answers to precisely such questions as truth, objective value and meaning, and method.
The Person and the Challenges 
Volume 3 (2013) Number 1238
Bibliography
Ashley OP, B., Theologies of the Body: Humanist and Christian, Braintree, MA, 1985, 
The Pope John Center.
Benedict XVI, Homily for the Feast of Sts. Peter and Paul, 29 VI 2008, Vatican City, 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/homilies/2008/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_hom_20080629_pallio_en.html (24 IV 2013).
Benedict XVI, Sacramentum Caritatis, Vatican City, 2007, Libreria Editrice Vaticana.
Brown P., The Body in Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early 
Christianity, New York 1988, Columbia University Press.
Bultmann R., Theology of the New Testament, vol. 1. New York 1951, Scribner’s.
Cahalan Kathleen A., Formed in the Image of Christ: The Sacramental-Moral Theology of 
Bernard Haring, C.Ss.R. Collegeville, MN, 2004, The Liturgical Press.
Cahill Lisa and M. Farley, Embodiment, Morality, and Medicine, Dordrecht 1995, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers.
Lauritzen P. (ed.), Cloning and the Future of Human Embryo Research, Oxford 2001, 
Oxford University Press.
Dworkin R., Life’s Dominion, New York 1993, Alfred A. Knopf.
Fagerberg, D., Virgil Michel on Liturgy and Social Justice: A New Appraisal, “Chicago 
Studies”, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Autumn/Winter 2009).
Fagerberg D., Theologia Prima: What is Liturgical Theology?, Chicago 2004, Hillenbrand 
Books.
Fletcher J., Four Indicators of Humanhood-The Enquiry Matures, “Hastings Center 
Report” Vol. 4, No. 6 (1975), p. 4–7.
Hauerwas S., Bailer C., Stoneking, Meador K.G., Cloutier D. (eds.), Growing Old in 
Christ, Grand Rapids, MI, 2003, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
Hart DB., The Anti-Theology of the Body, “The New Atlantis” (Summer 2005), p. 64–73.
Jenson RW., Reading the Body, “The New Atlantis” (Summer 2005), p. 73–82.
John Paul II, Man and Women He Created Them, Boston 2006, Pauline Publishers.
John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, Boston 1995, Pauline Publishers.
Prokes MT., Toward a Theology of the Body, Grand Rapids, MI, 1996, Eerdmans.
May W., Bioethics and Theology: How are they Related?, conference paper at “Congresso 
per la Federazione Dei Centri Internazionali di Inspiratione Personalista”, 9–10 VI 
2003.
McKenny G., To Relieve the Human Condition: Bioethics, Medicine, and the Body, Albany 
1997, SUNY Press.
Meilaender GC., Body, Soul, and Bioethics, Notre Dame, IN, 1995, University of Notre 
Dame Press.
Michel, O.S.B., V., The Liturgy as the Basis of Social Regeneration, “Orate Fratres” 
9 (1935), p. 536–545.
Lammers S., Verhey A.(eds.), On Moral Medicine, Grand Rapids, MI, 1998, William 
Eerdmans Publishing Company.
Ratzinger J., Spirit of the Liturgy, San Francisco 2000, Ignatius Press.
239
John Christopher Sikorski
The Hinge of Salvation: Body, Liturgy, and Bioethics
Rousseau MF., Deriving Bioethical Norms from the Theology of the Body, “National 
Catholic Bioethics Quarterly” (Spring 2003), p. 59–67.
Saliers D., Anderson E.B., Morrill B. (eds.), Liturgy and the Moral Self. Humanity at Full 
Stretch Before God: Essays in Honor of Donald E. Saliers, Collegeville, MN, 1998, 
Pueblo.
Schmemann A., Liturgy and Tradition, T. Fisch (ed.), Crestwood, NY, 2003, St. Vladimir’s 
Seminary Press.
Smith HL., Where Two or Three are Gathered: Liturgy and the Moral Life, Cleveland, OH, 
1995, The Pilgrim Press.
Vatican Council II, A. Flannery (ed.), New York 1998, Costello Publishing Company.
Waters B., This Mortal Flesh: Incarnation and Bioethics, Grand Rapids, MI, 2009, Brazos 
Press.
Wojtyła K., Love and Responsibility, HT Willetts (trans. and ed.), San Francisco 1993, 
Ignatius Press.
